Concerning the General Power of Taxation (continued)
Independent Journal Saturday, January 5, 1788 [Alexander
Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
I FLATTER
myself it has been clearly shown in my last number that the particular States,
under the proposed Constitution, would have COEQUAL
authority with the Union in the article of revenue, except as to duties on
imports. As this leaves open to the States far the greatest part of the
resources of the community, there can be no color for the assertion that they
would not possess means as abundant as could be desired for the supply of their
own wants, independent of all external control. That the field is sufficiently
wide will more fully appear when we come to advert to the inconsiderable share
of the public expenses for which it will fall to the lot of the State
governments to provide.
To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate
authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory against fact and
reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing ought
not to exist, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of to
prove that it does not exist contrary to the evidence of the fact itself. It is
well known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority, in the last
resort, resided for ages in two different political bodies not as branches of
the same legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each of
which an opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in the other, the
plebian. Many arguments might have been adduced to prove the unfitness of two
such seemingly contradictory authorities, each having power to annul or
repeal the acts of the other. But a man would have been regarded as
frantic who should have attempted at Rome to disprove their existence. It will
be readily understood that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA
and the COMITIA TRIBUTA. The former, in which the people
voted by centuries, was so arranged as to give a superiority to the patrician
interest; in the latter, in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had an
entire predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted for ages, and the
Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human greatness.
In the case particularly under consideration, there is no
such contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on either
side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there is little reason to
apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a short course of time, the wants of
the States will naturally reduce themselves within
a very narrow compass; and in the interim, the United States will, in
all probability, find it convenient to abstain wholly from those objects to
which the particular States would be inclined to resort.
To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this
question, it will be well to advert to the proportion between the objects that
will require a federal provision in respect to revenue, and those which will
require a State provision. We shall discover that the former are altogether
unlimited, and that the latter are circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In
pursuing this inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view
to the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity. Constitutions of
civil government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies,
but upon a combination of these with the probable exigencies of ages, according
to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be
more fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in
the national government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There
ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future
contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in their nature,
it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is true, perhaps, that a
computation might be made with sufficient accuracy to answer the purpose of the
quantity of revenue requisite to discharge the subsisting engagements of the
Union, and to maintain those establishments which, for some time to come, would
suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, or would it not rather be the
extreme of folly, to stop at this point, and to leave the government intrusted
with the care of the national defense in a state of absolute incapacity to
provide for the protection of the community against future invasions of the
public peace, by foreign war or domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we
ought to exceed this point, where can we stop, short of an indefinite power of
providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy to assert, in
general terms, the possibility of forming a rational judgment of a due provision
against probable dangers, yet we may safely challenge those who make the
assertion to bring forward their data, and may affirm that they would be found
as vague and uncertain as any that could be produced to establish the probable
duration of the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects of internal
attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of no satisfactory
calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people, it must form a part of
our policy to be able one day to defend that commerce. The support of a navy and
of naval wars would involve contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of
political arithmetic.
Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd
experiment in politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war
founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable it from
guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of other nations. A cloud
has been for some time hanging over the European world. If it should break forth
into a storm, who can insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would
not be spent upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are
entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials that now seem to be
collecting should be dissipated without coming to maturity, or if a flame should
be kindled without extending to us, what security can we have that our
tranquillity will long remain undisturbed from some other cause or from some
other quarter? Let us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our
option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot count upon the
moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition of others. Who could have
imagined at the conclusion of the last war that France and Britain, wearied and
exhausted as they both were, would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect
upon each other? To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to
conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the human
breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and beneficent sentiments of
peace; and that to model our political systems upon speculations of lasting
tranquillity, is to calculate on the weaker springs of the human character.
What are the chief sources of expense in every government?
What has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which several of
the European nations are oppressed? The answers plainly is, wars and rebellions;
the support of those institutions which are necessary to guard the body politic
against these two most mortal diseases of society. The expenses arising from
those institutions which are relative to the mere domestic police of a state, to
the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial departments, with their
different appendages, and to the encouragement of agriculture and manufactures
(which will comprehend almost all the objects of state expenditure), are
insignificant in comparison with those which relate to the national defense.
In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the
ostentatious apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth
part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class of expenses
last mentioned; the other fourteen fifteenths are absorbed in the payment of the
interest of debts contracted for carrying on the wars in which that country has
been engaged, and in the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the one hand,
it should be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the
ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy are not a proper
standard by which to judge of those which might be necessary in a republic, it
ought, on the other hand, to be remarked that there should be as great a
disproportion between the profusion and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its
domestic administration, and the frugality and economy which in that particular
become the modest simplicity of republican government. If we balance a proper
deduction from one side against that which it is supposed ought to be made from
the other, the proportion may still be considered as holding good.
But let us advert to the large debt which we have
ourselves contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a common
share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall instantly
perceive, without the aid of any elaborate illustration, that there must always
be an immense disproportion between the objects of federal and state
expenditures. It is true that several of the States, separately, are encumbered
with considerable debts, which are an excrescence of the late war. But this
cannot happen again, if the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts are
discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, which the State
governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere support of their
respective civil list; to which, if we add all contingencies, the total amount
in every State ought to fall considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.
In framing a government for posterity as well as
ourselves, we ought, in those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to
calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If this
principle be a just one our attention would be directed to a provision in favor
of the State governments for an annual sum of about two hundred thousand pounds;
while the exigencies of the Union could be susceptible of no limits, even in
imagination. In this view of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained
that the local governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an exclusive
source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred thousand pounds?
To extend its power further, in
exclusion of the authority of the Union, would be to take the resources
of the community out of those hands which stood in need of them for the public
welfare, in order to put them into other hands which could have no just or
proper occasion for them.
Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to
proceed upon the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between
the Union and its members, in proportion to their comparative
necessities; what particular fund could have been selected for the use of the
States, that would not either have been too much or too little too little for
their present, too much for their future wants? As to the line of separation
between external and internal taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough
computation, the command of two thirds of the resources of the community to
defray from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union, one
third of the resources of the community, to defray from nine tenths to nineteen
twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this boundary and content ourselves
with leaving to the States an exclusive power of taxing houses and lands, there
would still be a great disproportion between the means and the end;
the possession of one third of the resources of the community to supply, at
most, one tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been selected and
appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would have been
inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the particular States, and
would have left them dependent on the Union for a provision for this purpose.
The preceding train of observation will justify the
position which has been elsewhere laid down, that "A
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only
admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to this branch of
power, of State authority to that of the Union." Any separation of the
objects of revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a
sacrifice of the great
INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER
of the individual States. The convention thought the concurrent jurisdiction
preferable to that subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the
merit of reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the
Federal government with an adequate and independent power in the States to
provide for their own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which
this important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration.
PUBLIUS
Home
/
Index
/
Back
/
Next
|